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International petroleum law
Question No. 1 – (value 12%)
Little Oil Ltd. (“LOL”), a small international exploration company based in Scotland, recently
acquired Block 5 in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Democratic Republic of São
Tomé and Príncipe. Big Tex Oil Company (“BTOC”) contacts LOL about farming into LOL’s
position in Block 5. LOL is excited that BTOC is interested, since LOL will need financial help
in drilling the exploration well required by the Petroleum Agreement with the Government of
São Tomé and Príncipe. LOL has lots of data and information concerning Block 5, and Jim Hill,
LOL’s chief geologist, wants to send a copy of such data to BTOC as soon as possible. Just
before the package is to be sent to BTOC, the BTOC business development manager asks Jim
Hill if LOL will require BTOC to sign a confidentiality agreement before BTOC receives the
data. Jim Hill doesn’t know much about confidentiality agreements, and certainly doesn’t want
to do anything that scares away BTOC, but he also doesn’t want to put LOL at risk. Since LOL
has no in-house counsel, Jim Hill consults you regarding the following:
a. Why is a confidentiality agreement needed to show BTOC data regarding Block 5?
b. What risks does LOL have if there is no signed confidentiality agreement?
c. BTOC has suggested using the AIPN Model Form Confidentiality Agreement and you
are concerned about Clauses 6.2 and 7 which provide as follows:
“6.2 The Parties recognize that persons authorized to review the Confidential
Information under Article 4.2 may form mental impressions (i.e., impressions not
written or otherwise reduced to a record) regarding the Confidential Information. The
use of these mental impressions by those persons shall not be a violation of the
restriction contained in Article 6.1.”
“7. The liability of the Parties to each other for breach of this Agreement shall be
limited to direct actual damages only. Such direct actual damages shall be the sole
and exclusive remedy, and all other remedies or damages at law or in equity are
waived except such equitable relief as may be granted under Article 12. In no event
shall the Parties be liable to each other for any other damages, including loss of
profits or incidental, consequential, special, or punitive damages, regardless of
negligence or fault.”
Can you explain what these clauses are for and what risk they may present to LOL if they
are included in the confidentiality agreement?
EXAM NO. __________________
4
Question 2 – (value 10%)
BTOC wants LOL to include a dispute resolution clause in the confidentiality agreement that
provides for binding arbitration in London, England to resolve any disputes under the
confidentiality agreement. Jim Hill, LOL’s Chief Geologist, doesn’t know anything about
arbitration and consults you again. He wants to know:
a. Why should LOL agree to arbitration, especially in England, instead of just resolving any
disputes in the courts of São Tomé and Príncipe?
b. What key elements should be included in the arbitration clause in the confidentiality
agreement?
Question 3 – (value 8%)
BTOC is definitely interested in acquiring a portion of LOL’s interest in Block 5, however
BTOC needs some time to full evaluate all of the data regarding Block 5 and the Petroleum
Agreement, a production sharing contract, for Block 5, and then obtain their parent company’s
management approval for a Farmout Agreement. Jim Hill asks you:
a. Can a Memorandum of Understanding be legally binding?
b. What are the risks to LOL if they sign such a Memorandum of Understanding?
c. LOL’s parent company, Big Little Oil Company (“Big”) is currently in talks with another
exploration company about a possible merger. Could the merger, if it happens, impact
the Memorandum of Understanding?
Question 4 – (value 12%)
BTOC has noticed that the Petroleum Agreement for Block 5 provides for settlement of disputes
through binding arbitration under ICSID rules and that São Tomé and Príncipe is a signatory to
the ICSID Convention. However BTOC also notices that the Petroleum Agreement does not
contain a waiver of sovereign immunity clause. BTOC asks for an explanation and Jim Hill asks
you:
a. What is sovereign immunity? Why is a sovereign immunity waiver needed?
b. The government of São Tomé and Príncipe contractually agreed to arbitration in the
Petroleum Agreement, isn’t this good enough for a waiver?
c. Are there any other ways the São Tomé and Príncipe could waive sovereign immunity?
EXAM NO. __________________
5
Question 5 – (value 13%)
Jim Hill understands that LOL has a Petroleum Agreement for Block 5 in São Tomé and Príncipe
that is a production sharing contract type of agreement but asks you to explain the conceptual,
legal and commercial differences between a production sharing contract and a concession that
São Tomé and Príncipe is considering for future Blocks.
He also wants you to explain which form of contract LOL might prefer in the current low oil
price world.
Question 6 – (value 5%)
BTOC notes that the Petroleum Agreement provides for joint and several liability of the
contractor vis-à-vis the government of São Tomé and Príncipe. BTOC is concerned that its
credit rating is much better than LOL’s credit rating, and that the government will always come
to BTOC for any claim. How can BTOC be convinced that LOL will bear its share of costs
under the Petroleum Agreement? In the Farmout Agreement or in another agreement?
Question 7 – (value 10%)
BTOC negotiates and enters into a Farmout Agreement with LOL, using a form substantially the
same as the AIPN Model Form Farmout Agreement. The Petroleum Agreement provides that
the government’s approval is required for all transfers of interests under the Petroleum
Agreement.
a. What is the risk to LOL if it fails to get such government approval?
b. LOL requests government approval and, after 90 days, the government responds that
approval is conditioned on the payment of a $1,000,000. transfer fee to the government.
Who should pay the transfer fee?
c. If both BTOC and LOL refuse to pay the transfer fee, what exposure does LOL have
under the Farmout Agreement to BTOC? What exposure does BTOC have under the
Farmout Agreement to LOL?
EXAM NO. __________________
6
Question 8 – (value 10%)
BTOC operates a high sulfur recovery facility just outside of Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Since
the fields in São Tomé and Príncipe are anticipated to have natural gas with high sulfur, BTOC
wants to take a delegation from the Office of the National Petroleum Agency of São Tomé and
Príncipe (“ANP-STP”) to BTOC’s high sulfur recovery facility. BTOC would be responsible for
the following costs for the members of the delegation:
• Round trip Business class airfare from Sao Tome to Las Vegas;
• Airport transfers in Las Vegas;
• Hotel accommodations at Cesar’s Palace Hotel in Las Vegas;
• Transportation from Las Vegas to/from the high sulfur recovery facility;
• Three meals a day while in U.S.A.;
• A sightseeing side trip to the Hoover Dam and the Grand Canyon;
• A per diem of US$350 per day away from São Tomé and Príncipe, as per the written
regulations of ANP-STP.
Jim Hill has heard about the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but doesn’t really understand
the law very well. He asks you to advise him whether BTOC’s planned actions would create any
risk for LOL.
Question 9 – (value 10%)
LOL is the Operator of Block 5 and enters into a Service Contract with Goofy Drilling Limited
(“Goofy”) for the drilling of an exploration well in Block 5. Goofy insists on including a
“knock-for-knock” indemnity in the Service Contract. Jim Hill wants to understand the
differences between the following types of “knock-for-knock” indemnities and what they mean
for LOL:
• Contractor indemnifies Operator for harm to Contractor’s people and property, regardless
of fault
• Contractor indemnifies Operator for harm to Contractor Group’s people and property,
regardless of fault
• Contractor indemnifies Operator Group for harm to Contractor’s people and property,
regardless of fault
• Contractor indemnifies Operator Group for harm to Contractor Group’s people and
property, regardless of fault
EXAM NO. __________________
7

International petroleum law

Question No. 1 – (value 12%)
Little Oil Ltd. (“LOL”), a small international exploration company based in Scotland, recently
acquired Block 5 in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Democratic Republic of São
Tomé and Príncipe. Big Tex Oil Company (“BTOC”) contacts LOL about farming into LOL’s
position in Block 5. LOL is excited that BTOC is interested, since LOL will need financial help
in drilling the exploration well required by the Petroleum Agreement with the Government of
São Tomé and Príncipe. LOL has lots of data and information concerning Block 5, and Jim Hill,
LOL’s chief geologist, wants to send a copy of such data to BTOC as soon as possible. Just
before the package is to be sent to BTOC, the BTOC business development manager asks Jim
Hill if LOL will require BTOC to sign a confidentiality agreement before BTOC receives the
data. Jim Hill doesn’t know much about confidentiality agreements, and certainly doesn’t want
to do anything that scares away BTOC, but he also doesn’t want to put LOL at risk. Since LOL
has no in-house counsel, Jim Hill consults you regarding the following:
a. Why is a confidentiality agreement needed to show BTOC data regarding Block 5?
b. What risks does LOL have if there is no signed confidentiality agreement?
c. BTOC has suggested using the AIPN Model Form Confidentiality Agreement and you
are concerned about Clauses 6.2 and 7 which provide as follows:
“6.2 The Parties recognize that persons authorized to review the Confidential
Information under Article 4.2 may form mental impressions (i.e., impressions not
written or otherwise reduced to a record) regarding the Confidential Information. The
use of these mental impressions by those persons shall not be a violation of the
restriction contained in Article 6.1.”
“7. The liability of the Parties to each other for breach of this Agreement shall be
limited to direct actual damages only. Such direct actual damages shall be the sole
and exclusive remedy, and all other remedies or damages at law or in equity are
waived except such equitable relief as may be granted under Article 12. In no event
shall the Parties be liable to each other for any other damages, including loss of
profits or incidental, consequential, special, or punitive damages, regardless of
negligence or fault.”
Can you explain what these clauses are for and what risk they may present to LOL if they
are included in the confidentiality agreement?
EXAM NO. __________________
4
Question 2 – (value 10%)
BTOC wants LOL to include a dispute resolution clause in the confidentiality agreement that
provides for binding arbitration in London, England to resolve any disputes under the
confidentiality agreement. Jim Hill, LOL’s Chief Geologist, doesn’t know anything about
arbitration and consults you again. He wants to know:
a. Why should LOL agree to arbitration, especially in England, instead of just resolving any
disputes in the courts of São Tomé and Príncipe?
b. What key elements should be included in the arbitration clause in the confidentiality
agreement?
Question 3 – (value 8%)
BTOC is definitely interested in acquiring a portion of LOL’s interest in Block 5, however
BTOC needs some time to full evaluate all of the data regarding Block 5 and the Petroleum
Agreement, a production sharing contract, for Block 5, and then obtain their parent company’s
management approval for a Farmout Agreement. Jim Hill asks you:
a. Can a Memorandum of Understanding be legally binding?
b. What are the risks to LOL if they sign such a Memorandum of Understanding?
c. LOL’s parent company, Big Little Oil Company (“Big”) is currently in talks with another
exploration company about a possible merger. Could the merger, if it happens, impact
the Memorandum of Understanding?
Question 4 – (value 12%)
BTOC has noticed that the Petroleum Agreement for Block 5 provides for settlement of disputes
through binding arbitration under ICSID rules and that São Tomé and Príncipe is a signatory to
the ICSID Convention. However BTOC also notices that the Petroleum Agreement does not
contain a waiver of sovereign immunity clause. BTOC asks for an explanation and Jim Hill asks
you:
a. What is sovereign immunity? Why is a sovereign immunity waiver needed?
b. The government of São Tomé and Príncipe contractually agreed to arbitration in the
Petroleum Agreement, isn’t this good enough for a waiver?
c. Are there any other ways the São Tomé and Príncipe could waive sovereign immunity?
EXAM NO. __________________
5
Question 5 – (value 13%)
Jim Hill understands that LOL has a Petroleum Agreement for Block 5 in São Tomé and Príncipe
that is a production sharing contract type of agreement but asks you to explain the conceptual,
legal and commercial differences between a production sharing contract and a concession that
São Tomé and Príncipe is considering for future Blocks.
He also wants you to explain which form of contract LOL might prefer in the current low oil
price world.
Question 6 – (value 5%)
BTOC notes that the Petroleum Agreement provides for joint and several liability of the
contractor vis-à-vis the government of São Tomé and Príncipe. BTOC is concerned that its
credit rating is much better than LOL’s credit rating, and that the government will always come
to BTOC for any claim. How can BTOC be convinced that LOL will bear its share of costs
under the Petroleum Agreement? In the Farmout Agreement or in another agreement?
Question 7 – (value 10%)
BTOC negotiates and enters into a Farmout Agreement with LOL, using a form substantially the
same as the AIPN Model Form Farmout Agreement. The Petroleum Agreement provides that
the government’s approval is required for all transfers of interests under the Petroleum
Agreement.
a. What is the risk to LOL if it fails to get such government approval?
b. LOL requests government approval and, after 90 days, the government responds that
approval is conditioned on the payment of a $1,000,000. transfer fee to the government.
Who should pay the transfer fee?
c. If both BTOC and LOL refuse to pay the transfer fee, what exposure does LOL have
under the Farmout Agreement to BTOC? What exposure does BTOC have under the
Farmout Agreement to LOL?
EXAM NO. __________________
6
Question 8 – (value 10%)
BTOC operates a high sulfur recovery facility just outside of Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Since
the fields in São Tomé and Príncipe are anticipated to have natural gas with high sulfur, BTOC
wants to take a delegation from the Office of the National Petroleum Agency of São Tomé and
Príncipe (“ANP-STP”) to BTOC’s high sulfur recovery facility. BTOC would be responsible for
the following costs for the members of the delegation:
• Round trip Business class airfare from Sao Tome to Las Vegas;
• Airport transfers in Las Vegas;
• Hotel accommodations at Cesar’s Palace Hotel in Las Vegas;
• Transportation from Las Vegas to/from the high sulfur recovery facility;
• Three meals a day while in U.S.A.;
• A sightseeing side trip to the Hoover Dam and the Grand Canyon;
• A per diem of US$350 per day away from São Tomé and Príncipe, as per the written
regulations of ANP-STP.
Jim Hill has heard about the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but doesn’t really understand
the law very well. He asks you to advise him whether BTOC’s planned actions would create any
risk for LOL.
Question 9 – (value 10%)
LOL is the Operator of Block 5 and enters into a Service Contract with Goofy Drilling Limited
(“Goofy”) for the drilling of an exploration well in Block 5. Goofy insists on including a
“knock-for-knock” indemnity in the Service Contract. Jim Hill wants to understand the
differences between the following types of “knock-for-knock” indemnities and what they mean
for LOL:
• Contractor indemnifies Operator for harm to Contractor’s people and property, regardless
of fault
• Contractor indemnifies Operator for harm to Contractor Group’s people and property,
regardless of fault
• Contractor indemnifies Operator Group for harm to Contractor’s people and property,
regardless of fault
• Contractor indemnifies Operator Group for harm to Contractor Group’s people and
property, regardless of fault
EXAM NO. __________________
7

Interested in a PLAGIARISM-FREE paper based on these particular instructions?...with 100% confidentiality?

Order Now